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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the need for greater information 
sharing and increased intelligence capabilities across various law enforcement levels and locales 
became widely apparent (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004). State and major urban 
area fusion centers, of which there are currently 78 nationwide, have been one of the main vehicles 
for enhancing information sharing by acting as hubs for information and intelligence on terrorist, 
criminal, and other public safety threats within a particular geographic area (Carter & Carter, 
2009a). Though the literature on fusion centers is beginning to take shape, there remains two 
critically understudied questions that rest at the core of fusion center research and practice. First, 
how do fusion centers develop relationships with both law enforcement and non-law enforcement 
organizations? Second, what mechanisms do fusion centers utilize to safeguard against violations 
of individual privacy? The present research employs a mixed-methods approach to provide initial 
answers to these questions. More specifically, national survey data is reported to describe these 
issues and three in-depth case studies of fusion centers in Florida, Nevada, and Michigan are 
leveraged to identify specific organizational practices.  
 
2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
2.1 Fusion Centers and the Sharing of Information 
Fusion centers are brick-and-mortar entities comprised of representatives primarily from 
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies as well as members of the private sector and 
public organizations. In theory, this diverse composition of organizations is best positioned to 
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identify and understand threats facing a particular jurisdiction or region. The premise of fusion 
centers is that information analyzed from diverse sources gleans more accurate intelligence (Clark, 
2007) through a “fusion” process resulting from analyzed raw intelligence provided by the 
disparate organizations (Carter & Chermak, 2012). Dissemination of intelligence products to 
relevant stakeholders brings the intelligence fusion process full circle and helps to ensure that 
fusion centers do not operate as silos of information (Ratcliffe, 2008). While the idea of state and 
regional collaborative centers is not new to law enforcement (Carter & Carter, 2009a), the rise of 
contemporary fusion centers occurred simultaneous to the emergence of intelligence-led policing 
(ILP) within the United States (Carter & Carter, 2009b; Chermak et al., 2013). In the highly 
fragmented U.S. law enforcement environment, fusion centers are positioned to enhance ILP 
practice (Carter, 2015). With currently 53 state and 25 major urban area fusion centers spread 
throughout the country and U.S. territories, each center is designed to cover a specific geographic 
area, connecting local, state, and federal law enforcement, emergency services, transportation 
services, and a wide variety of private businesses within their state or geographic area. Further, 
these centers serve as a force multiplier that enhances the analytic capabilities within their areas 
of operation (Saari, 2010). Each jurisdiction has distinctive and diverse needs. As a Congressional 
Research Service report stated, “There appears to be no ‘one-size-fits-all’ structural or operational 
model for fusion centers” (Rollins, 2008, pp.18). In fact, a large number of centers have undergone 
changes in structure and focus since their inception in order to meet the needs of their constituents. 
Few scholars have gained access to fusion centers and begun to examine the intelligence 
process within these organizations. Graphia-Joyal (2010) employed a qualitative study that 
included 49 interviews at four fusion centers in the northeast region of the U.S. Her study 
concluded that centers had yet to develop a robust analytical capability. Rather, they had been 
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providing investigative case support that lacked analysis to inform operational, tactical, or strategic 
action (the goal of intelligence analysis). This lack of analysis with regard to intelligence 
production has been echoed by other scholars examining intelligence-led and analytic-driven 
policing. In their ethnographic study of four intelligence units from the United Kingdom, Innes, 
Fielding, and Cope (2005) concluded that analytic functions within these units were, in reality, a 
repackaging of traditional policing data and information. The intelligence units examined 
attempted to lend a degree of objectivity to the products created as a result of an analytic process 
that lacked any true scientific application. This may be the result of what Cope (2004) contends to 
be a cultural disconnect between analysts and police personnel as well as a general lack of 
understanding as to how analysis can influence police practice. Similarly, through 86 interviews 
with varying police intelligence personnel from six agencies in Canada, Sanders, Weston, and 
Schott (2015) observed that intelligence production and information sharing were steeped in 
rhetoric and contingent upon an agency’s culture to embrace innovative analyses. Though each 
agency appeared to institutionalize intelligence-led policing, actual intelligence analysis and 
analytic-driven decision making was an exception rather than the rule.  
 Cooney, Rojek, and Kaminski (2011) provide a more optimistic outlook with respect to 
information sharing. Using a quantitative survey of local law enforcement personnel in South 
Carolina, they illustrated the utility of the state fusion center and noted that 75 percent of the police 
executives found the center to be moderately useful or very useful. A general sense of the 
applicability of fusion center products to client operations may be challenging given the diversity 
of end-user needs. This is both a strength and weakness of the fusion center model as these centers 
are designed to promote information and intelligence sharing across disparate organizations, but 
this organizational variation creates hurdles for centers to tailor analytic products (Carter, 2015). 
4 
 
A diverse group of end-users is ideal for information collection and dissemination as personnel 
from different law enforcement environments (i.e., federal, state, local, rural, urban) and sectors 
(i.e., financial, private business, public health, transportation, emergency management) are able to 
provide unique information to be integrated into the analytic process. However, many fusion 
centers currently lack the resources and analytic capacity to create analytic products that are 
tailored to the unique needs of these diverse groups. As Lewandowski and Carter (2014) observed 
in their survey of fusion center end-users, this lack of specificity within analytic products can 
create dissatisfaction and hinder relationships between fusion centers and their end-users as the 
value fusion centers can provide via their analytic capacity is minimized.   
Ratcliffe and Walden (2010) employed a mixed-methodology to examine the volume and 
frequency of information that flowed from local law enforcement to the state fusion center. Their 
statistics reported that 48 percent of New Jersey troopers had not communicated with the fusion 
center and that many of the troopers voluntarily sent information only because they believed it 
would help their investigation – not because it could have implications for terrorism or other 
criminality. Within the qualitative portion of their research, Ratcliffe and Walden (2010, pp. 9) 
found that fusion center services were largely unknown or misunderstood by troopers, with one 
trooper noting: “I don’t know when to use them, so I don’t use them. I don’t know what they can 
do for me.” Despite this disconnect, the researchers found some positive outcomes as troopers who 
did engage the fusion center almost always received the information or intelligence they were 
seeking.  
Ratcliffe and Walden (2010) also indicated that troopers in their study interpreted their role 
as one that consumes and further distributes intelligence products received from the center, but 
they had no responsibility for pushing information to the fusion center. In their recommendations 
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for this gap in information sharing, the authors concluded fusion centers must develop an outreach 
component to ensure that fusion center partners are not only aware of their services, but also direct 
them on how to effectively collect and contribute information to the fusion center. Relatedly, 
scholars have recognized that law enforcement may not understand the utility of fusion centers 
because the centers need to be more proactive in marketing themselves. Studies have noted that 
the centers do a poor job of communicating their analytic services (Chermak et al., 2010; Graphia-
Joyal, 2010) and data availability (Carter & Chermak, 2012). In a similar vein, Cooney et al. (2011) 
found that personnel who had received training about a fusion center’s capabilities were more 
likely to rate the center as useful.   
2.2 Private and Public Health Sectors as Fusion Center Partners 
To best protect against acts of terrorism and develop comprehensive threat awareness 
capabilities, fusion centers have been directed to engage the private and public health sectors to 
establish a process for sharing information (Lessons Learned Information Sharing, 2005). The 
Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE) (2006) observed that the 
private sector can be a rich resource of information. Many large corporations have sophisticated 
security operations that monitor global threats to their facilities, products, and personnel. This 
information is more diverse than that traditionally captured by law enforcement and can provide 
for more robust analytic products. Similarly, the private sector is a “need to know” consumer of 
law enforcement intelligence as 85 percent of the critical infrastructure in the United States is 
operated within the private sector (Homeland Security Advisory Council, 2005). Moreover, the 
private sector has a large personnel force that could be leveraged to significantly increase the 
capacity for fusion centers to receive reports of suspicious activity.   
6 
 
In 2011 the Health Security: Public Health and Medical Integration for Fusion Centers 
document was published by the U.S. Department of Justice to provide a roadmap for integrating 
public health information into the fusion process. This initiative urged fusion centers to work with 
public health partners to conduct ongoing risk assessments and mutually access relevant and timely 
information in support of threat awareness. The integration of public health partners positions 
health information to be readily available in an environment where analytic techniques are 
commonplace for strategic planning and identifying threats (Carter & Rip, 2013). This 
collaborative effort is believed to enhance the preparedness level of public health practitioners 
across the country, while supporting the fusion center all-hazards approach to prevention, 
protection, and response (Riegle, 2009).  
A report from the Centers for Disease Prevention and Control (2011, pp.55) notes the 
benefit of public health participation in fusion centers:  
“[Fusion center participation enhances…] the ability to conduct multijurisdictional, 
multidisciplinary exchange of health-related information and situational awareness data 
among federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal levels of government, and the private 
sector. This capability includes the routine sharing of information as well as issuing of 
public health alerts…in preparation for, and in response to, events or incidents of public 
health significance.”  
 
Moreover, contemporary policing has recognized the importance of integrating public health 
information into policing strategies to further reduce crime, disorder, and calls for service while 
improving the quality of communities (Wood et al., 2015). Such strategies are rooted in the 
movement of harm-focused policing that seeks to facilitate public safety through a more expansive 
view of the role of police while “An emphasis on harm would provide a welcomed focus for 
intelligence-led policing” (Ratcliffe, 2015, pp.179). The inclusion of health-related information in 
fusion centers is just one aspect that raises concerns of the legality and privacy issues surrounding 
law enforcement information sharing. Related concerns have been voiced by critics of fusion 
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centers and are thus an emphasis of the present study to provide insight into how fusion centers 
attempt to safeguard against these concerns.  
2.3 Privacy Concerns in the Information Sharing Environment 
Law enforcement generally, and fusion centers more specifically, have access to vast 
amounts of diverse data from law enforcement and open sources (Pearsall, 2010). This effort to 
collect large amounts of information and data, combined with efforts to develop mechanisms for 
secure access and sharing, have led civil rights advocates to worry that this increase in data and 
federal security clearances serves as proof of far-reaching law enforcement initiatives to collect 
and secretly share personal information (Taylor & Russell, 2012). Such concerns are fostered by 
the assumption that fusion centers operate as a pre-emptive law enforcement action wherein 
information is collected without the presence of a reasonable suspicion (Masse & Rollins, 2007) 
and that such data is readily available to an array of law enforcement and non-law enforcement 
personnel who could use this data for purposes of unlawful discrimination2 (Monahan & Palmer, 
2009). 
Critics of fusion centers contend that fusion centers have developed ad-hoc secure sharing 
portals (i.e., web-based databases or internal databases with credential login) to serve as 
mechanisms for sharing information with varied end-users. As these sharing systems are largely 
developed and operated by fusion centers themselves with no overseeing authority, concerns may 
exist surrounding background checks for access to sensitive information, expectations for 
information and data usage, and processes to review, renew, or revoke continued access. Such an 
approach is largely necessitated by a confound of security and legal requirements that apply to 
2 Racial profiling, violations of privacy and the abridgement of First Amendment protections of expressive activity 
are the most commonly expressed concerns. 
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some users (such as law enforcement personnel) but not others (such as private sector personnel) 
(Monahan & Palmer, 2009). Moreover, critics perceive an overall lack of transparency with respect 
to how fusion centers actually share information, who has access to information, and how 
information is used by different partners that may include, for example, partners from the financial 
banking sector, critical infrastructure (transportation and energy), public schools, and public health 
(hospitals and state health organizations).  
The involvement of non-law enforcement partners in fusion centers has been a source of 
contention as such participation is thought to be questionable as to whether or not the government 
has the right to view, analyze, and disseminate the personal data collected by these organizations 
(Electronic Privacy Information Center, 2008). Moreover, it has been alleged that the involvement 
of private organizations in the fusion center process allows for fusion centers to circumvent the 
law by operating through a private entity (Monahan & Palmer, 2009) and that such partnerships 
may provide opportunities for corruption and the misuse of information (Newkirk, 2010). In 
response, fusion centers claim they have rigid privacy policies which have been independently 
reviewed by designated U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) personnel as well as having 
required non-disclosure agreements with all fusion center personnel and partners. 
The creation of DHS’ Nationwide SAR Initiative to report suspicious activities that may be 
precursor behaviors for acts of terrorism has further fueled fusion center privacy and civil rights 
concerns (Harper, 2009). Privacy advocates contend that this initiative opens the door for racial 
profiling (German & Stanley, 2008) and the unlawful surveillance of citizens (Monahan, 2011, 
Monahan & Regan, 2012). Others have gone as far to allege the collection of suspicious activity 
reports may equate to the identification of dangerous classes of people (Taylor & Russell, 2012) 
resulting in tensions between these classes of individuals and the police (Deflem, 2004). Kurlander 
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(2005) notes that legal mechanisms have slowed such initiatives. However, German and Stanley 
(2008) contend that the federal government allows states to exempt fusion centers from these legal 
constraints. To remedy these issues, it has been suggested that fusion centers employ an 
independent authority to ensure centers are operating within constitutional and legal bounds and 
that there exists a system of accountability (Rollins & Connors, 2007; Taylor & Russell, 2012). 
Despite these concerns and calls for systems of checks and balances, research has yet to quantify 
the extent to which fusion centers safeguard against privacy concerns and develop effective 
practices for protecting civil rights. The present research provides actionable findings to inform 
this shortcoming.  
3. Methods
To date, much of the fusion center research has employed survey methodologies (Carter, 
2015; Chermak et al., 2013; Lewandowski & Carter, 2014; Cooney et al., 2011). While these 
studies have provided much-needed scholarly guidance, they lack contextual detail necessary to 
explain nuances of these complex organizations (Carter, 2015). Chermak, et al. (2013) note that 
while their study allows them to identify patterns of information sharing that hold across various 
fusion centers, it does not allow them to dig deeper into the reasons for their findings. Carter (2015) 
urged for such in-depth studies to better identify the determinants of information sharing. Few 
studies have explored fusion center functioning through in depth interviews; those that do have 
shed valuable insights. As Graphia-Joyal (2010) noted, interviewing personnel allowed for 
exploration of “poorly understood contexts and constructs” (pp. 362), providing a richer set of data 
that help inform future policy and research. Law enforcement fusion centers are designed to 
facilitate information sharing across, and analyze information from, disparate organizations. This 
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mission involves a range of complex and nuanced practices that have received minimal scholarly 
attention to date. The present study seeks to illustrate these practices and provide unique context 
as to how fusion centers engage in information sharing with diverse organizations and make efforts 
to safeguard against privacy concerns. To this end, the present study employs a mixed-methods 
approach consisting of a national survey of fusion centers and three in-depth case studies 
conducted at fusion centers in Florida, Nevada, and Michigan within the same time period.  
 
3.1 Survey of Fusion Centers 
Survey data were gleaned from a larger project3 and include responses from 96 fusion 
center personnel.4 The survey sample of fusion center respondents comprised of persons who 
attended the National Fusion Center Conference (NFCC). Attendees of the NFCC include fusion 
center directors, administrators, and upper-level operational personnel. This sampling strategy, 
which includes nationally representative fusion center personnel, was chosen for three reasons. 
First, in attending this conference, these persons were identified by their respective fusion center 
as a key representative of their organization. Second, as a result of their selection on behalf of their 
center, this sample includes personnel who have a working knowledge of key issues tied to their 
fusion center and its intelligence capacity. Thus, these persons are best able to address the 
organizational capacity of their centers. Third, these persons’ awareness of the contemporary 
intelligence structures, requirements, and formal communication networks involved in fusion 
                                                 
3 Grant award number 2008-IJCX-0007 from the National Institute of Justice, US Department of Justice. 
4 The most responses from within a single fusion center was three, which occurred for two centers. Ten fusion centers 
had two respondents while the remaining 70 fusion centers in the study had a single survey respondent. The findings 
to follow present responses from all 96 survey respondents as this approach was deemed most appropriate by the 
research team to reflect perceptions of fusion center practices. For diagnostic purposes, a complex survey design in 
STATA (ICv14) was employed to adjust for clustered responses from respondents within the same fusion center. Not 
surprisingly, given minimal multiple responses from the same center and the present research’s focus on descriptives, 
the findings were consistent. 
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centers increases the likelihood that they will have direct knowledge about the strengths and 
weaknesses of these issues. This sampling approach to target key knowledgeable personnel in law 
enforcement organizations has been utilized in police research focused on specialty personnel 
when examining similar contemporary issues, such as police assigned to cybercrime (Bossler & 
Holt, 2012; Holt & Bossler, 2012). 
Table 1 displays descriptive information of the fusion centers represented in the current 
study. Responses were reported predominantly by administrators (51%) and supervisors (20%). 
This is beneficial to the validity of the responses, as these persons are most likely to have an 
accurate perception of the activities that occur within the center as they oversee daily operations 
and strategic planning. The modal response category for tenure at the fusion center was one to 
three years. This is not outside the norm, given the nature of turnover within fusion centers as 
agencies rotate assigned personnel. In the case of newly assigned personnel, having been assigned 
to the fusion center for only one to three years may not be indicative of a lack of knowledge, since 
assigned personnel are typically chosen as a result of their experience in intelligence operations 
within their home agency. 
[ Insert Table 1. Fusion Center Respondent Descriptives approximately here ] 
3.2 Case Studies 
Greene (2014) challenged scholars to balance quantitative prediction and qualitative 
context in policing research. He argued the evidence-based movement, while beneficial for a 
number of reasons, diluted the “cognitive lens” (pp. 193) through which meaning could be gleaned 
from research to inform practice and future inquiry. He further contended that such context must 
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be captured through qualitative methods. The present study embraces this approach through in-
depth case studies of three fusion centers; Florida Fusion Center (FCC), Southern Nevada Counter-
terrorism Center (SNCTC), and Michigan Intelligence Operations Center (MIOC). A case study 
approach is most appropriate for this research given little is known about the organizational 
practices of fusion centers and their highly complex structures (Fitzpatrick, Sanders, & Worthen 
2003). Each of these centers became operational in 2007, are designated as “primary” centers by 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security5, and focus on counter-terrorism, all-threat, all-crimes, 
and all-hazards. The FFC is operated solely by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement 
(FDLE) while the MIOC is co-operated by the Michigan State Police (MSP) and National Guard. 
The SNCTC is operated by the Las Vegas Metro Police Department (LVMPD). These three centers 
display welcomed variation across their organizational structure and geographic location. While 
the FCC and SNCTC exhibited organizational consistency over time, the MIOC was undergoing 
an administrative transition at the time of study. This transition period provided an opportunity to 
observe operational challenges that are likely experienced by the broader national network of 
fusion centers (i.e., change in management and other personnel; developing new policies and 
procedures; staff learning new job responsibilities, developing new information sharing 
partnerships).  
Though the FCC, SNCTC, and MIOC are only three of 53 officially recognized primary 
fusion centers, their organizational capacity mirrors those of the general fusion center population. 
A report by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2014) documented the organizational 
capabilities and practices of each fusion center nationwide and quantified operational scores for 
each center across a range of metrics. Based on these metrics, the three fusion centers examined 
5 http://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-locations-and-contact-information 
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in the case studies each received an overall rating comparable to centers across the country. This 
rating lends credence to the generalizability of the findings to be presented in the current study as 
the operations and practices of the center of study are consistent with those nationwide. More 
specifically, the likeness of the fusion centers sampled in the present study to those of the greater 
population of fusion centers suggests promise for the findings to be applicable for improved 
practice for fusion centers across the United States. The decision to conduct case studies at these 
three centers was the result of the research team’s contacts with key fusion center staff as well as 
independent recommendations from subject matter experts.  
Following the completion of the national survey of fusion centers, the research team 
conducted on-site visits with each fusion center to interview administrative and analytic personnel. 
Interviews were conducted with the use of a semi-structured interview protocol that was developed 
to explore findings observed in the national survey as well as the aforementioned operational 
challenges identified in research and federal reports. At each of the three centers, the research team 
conducted interviews with the fusion center’s Director (lead administrator), one supervisor of 
center operations, one records management person, and two intelligence analysts (one of which 
was a supervisory analysts at each center) for a total of five interviews per center. In total, the 
majority of interview time, an average of 90 minutes per interview, was conducted with fusion 
center directors, administrators, and supervisory analysts as the research team was focused on 
gathering data regarding key fusion center practices, policies, and initiatives. Upper-level 
management personnel were best positioned to inform the research team on these issues.  
 
3.3 Analytic Strategy 
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Survey responses are presented in figure format for illustrative purposes. Valid percent is 
presented along the x-axis. Means and standard deviations are also reported in the tables below 
each figure. Reliability coefficients (alpha) are provided to demonstrate internal consistency across 
the items presented within groups. Though the items contained within groups, and presented as 
such, do not reflect any form of latent construct, the use of reliability coefficients assists to affirm 
that the items reported grouped appropriately for discussion. Qualitative data was captured through 
investigator field notes and audio recordings of interviews that were later transcribed, managed, 
and analyzed within theme-identification software (Nvivo v11). Drawing upon a grounded theory 
approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1999) that allows for repeat constructs, or elements, to emerge in 
qualitative data in combination with insights provided from previous research, key response traits, 
indicators, and themes were reviewed and agreed upon by the research team. To enhance the 
validity of interpretations from the interviews, the research team undertook additional phone and 
email communications with fusion center personnel occurred to solicit feedback, clarify, and 
reaffirm the information gathered (King, 1994). Though the research team identified additional 
information believed to be insightful, only the findings which gained saturation and consensus 
among those interviewed are reported. Saturation of qualitative findings is a subjective threshold 
(Fusch & Ness, 2015) with debate surrounding necessary sample size (O’Reilly & Parker, 2013).  
The present study sought to establish saturation using three methods. First, case studies 
were conducted at three unique fusion centers. This allowed the research team to interview persons 
from diverse environments. Second, different personnel types were interviewed that included 
administrators, analytic supervisors, and analysts. This personnel diversity allows for the 
triangulation of individual perceptions of different personnel types to converge on consistent 
themes (Denzin, 2012) and therefore reinforce the reliability and validity of qualitative findings 
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(Stavros & Westberg, 2009). Though the bulk of interviews were conducted with upper-
management, the perceptions and observations from all personnel were captured and analyzed. 
Relatedly, the research team employed a saturation grid to cross-tabulate qualitative data across 
respondents and positions. The use of such grids demonstrate levels of saturation when consistent 
findings are intersected across people and positions (Brod, Tesler, & Christiansen, 2009).  
 
4. Discussion of Findings 
Given the mixed-methodology and the focus of this research to inform fusion center 
practice and policy, findings are both reported and discussed in this section. The unique insights 
from the case studies provide contextual nuances for the survey findings reported and are thus 
discussed in parallel. This section presents findings that illustrate fusion center practices and 
operational gaps from a national sample and unique practices and lessons learned from three fusion 
center case studies to inform gaps and challenges identified in the survey findings and previous 
research. Conclusions, in addition to recommendations for policy, are provided in the subsequent 
section.  
 
4.1 Cultivating Relationships for Information Sharing: Survey Results 
Respondents were asked to indicate how close of a working relationship they experienced 
for purposes of information sharing with a range of jurisdictions and sectors. Respondents were 
also asked to indicate their level of satisfaction with these relationships. Figure 1 reports 
respondents’ perceptions of these information sharing relationships as “very close” or “distant.” 
Survey respondents indicated having the closest information sharing relationships with law 
enforcement organizations; specifically with state (60%) and local (58%) law enforcement 
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followed by other fusion centers (47%). Given the mission of fusion centers to serve as information 
hubs, it is reasonable to question why the reported percentages are not higher. Information from 
the site visit interviews suggest that fusion centers were focusing on getting their structure and 
processes in place – including the more mundane but time-consuming process of installing secure 
systems and gaining security clearances. Interviews at each site visit clearly indicated that 
personnel understood the need to have proactive outreach with agencies in their jurisdictions. 
The extent to which these relationships were perceived as “distant” was minimal across 
each of these law enforcement categories. Interestingly, this is not the case with respect to the 
private and public health sectors. Respondents reported a “distant” relationship (22%) with the 
private sector more frequently than a “very close” relationship (15%). Although 31 percent of 
respondents indicated a “very close” relationship with public health, a relatively large proportion 
also indicated their relationship with public health as “distant” (18%). Interviews during the site 
visits found that establishing relationships with the private sector and public health posed 
information sharing challenges related to privacy for which there was little precedent. Hence, some 
relationships were started with operational agreements. Information sharing agreements would 
take longer and were largely dependent on legal advisors. 
In terms of satisfaction, fusion centers sampled were generally not very satisfied with their 
information sharing relationships. Consistent with perceptions of working proximity, respondents 
rated their satisfaction levels higher among law enforcement partners. Private sector (9%) and 
public health (13%) were again the sector receiving the fewest positive satisfaction results. Given 
the overall lack of engagement displayed in Figure 1, these low responses might be linked to lack 
of interaction with these entities as opposed to specific concerns about these relationships. 
Moreover, despite few respondents reporting a “distant” relationship with law enforcement 
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organizations, the overall levels of “very close” relationships are perhaps lower than would be 
expected given the mission of fusion centers to facilitate information sharing across disparate law 
enforcement organizations. This holds true for reported satisfaction with other law enforcement 
organizations as well. These descriptives begin to illustrate the gap between fusion centers and the 
organizations which they seek to engage in information sharing.  
Unique practices to close these gaps and improve relationships were found among the case 
study fusion centers. The most unique and promising practices gleaned from the case studies 
focused on fostering relationships with the private sector. These findings are interesting given the 
survey results reported minimal fusion center interaction and satisfaction with the private sector. 
It is important to note that the survey occurred as most fusion centers were becoming operational, 
and thus one would expect weak relationships with private sector. In addition, two of the centers 
chosen for the case studies (Florida and Nevada) had reached operational maturity. As a result, 
these two centers had been able to experience the value in such relationships and reached an 
operational period where such partnerships could be cultivated; as evidenced by the innovations 
below.  
 
[ Insert Figure 1. Relationships for Information Sharing approximately here ] 
 
4.2 Cultivating Relationships for Information Sharing: Case Studies Findings 
Through discussion with the center personnel, the FFC was conscious of these relationship 
gaps and conducted a “gap analysis” to identify the root problems and develop solutions for 
improved information sharing. This gap analysis revealed that relationships with local law 
enforcement seemed to hinge on two factors; 1) local agencies recognizing what information 
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needed to be pushed to the FFC and, 2) a lack of awareness of resources the FFC actually provides. 
This knowledge shortcoming was coupled with a lack of commitment from local law enforcement 
executives. An FFC administrator noted this “…lack of support and buy-in at all levels of the 
organization is a key obstacle to effective information sharing. The sub-par commitment is not in 
the form of unwillingness to share information but insufficient resources needed to meet the 
standards for information sharing we [FFC] outline to ensure quality, legality and effectiveness.” 
In addition, the gap analysis identified three barriers to private sector cooperation. FFC personnel 
explained that private businesses were 1) hesitant to share proprietary information, 2) desired 
intelligence products that related to their operational environment, and had 3) difficulty in gaining 
access to government information sharing systems as a result of their non-law enforcement status.  
To remedy these shortcomings, the FFC implemented two initiatives. First, a formal 
intelligence-liaison officer (ILO) program was developed to gain participation and information 
integrity compliance with local law enforcement. Second, the FFC created the “BusinessSafe” 
program as an outreach component specifically for the private sector. The ILO program involved 
the assignment of specific persons to be a designated information sharing point of contact that 
sends, receives, and integrates information between their agency and the FFC. In addition to 
sharing information, the ILO is responsible for the legality and integrity of information, 
communicating FFC resources to their home agency, and communicating their agency needs to 
the FFC. Though an ILO may be physically assigned to the fusion center, the more common 
arrangement was for the ILO to perform his or her fusion center responsibilities simultaneously to 
those of their home agency from their home location. This ILO program also created a mechanism 
through which the FFC could “market” their resources and capabilities to local law enforcement 
with the hope of garnering additional support from the ILO’s neighboring agencies. As one FFC 
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interviewee noted, “The ILO program provides a grass-roots approach to developing the much-
needed local law enforcement participation in the broader information sharing environment.”  
 To engage the private sector, the FFC launched the BusinessSafe program that incorporates 
both website and in-person components. The website is a designated private sector-only secure 
portal that provides businesses with the necessary tools and resources to facilitate two-way 
communication with the fusion center. This website hosts a variety of private sector specific fact 
sheets for businesses to reference that are categorized within specific business areas – such as 
businesses operating out of ocean ports, theme parks, or sporting events. Private sector partners 
are able to retrieve these analytic products as well as gain access to threat and security information 
that the FFC determines is applicable and legal for sharing. This website allows for businesses to 
push information to the FFC and connect with other designated security personnel from the private 
sector in their region. To safeguard against individual privacy concerns, legalities of law 
enforcement information, and the proprietary nature of private sector information, both the FFC 
and private sector organization would sign memorandums of understanding (MOU) that 
specifically outlined how information would be shared, stored, and utilized. Participation in the 
BuisnessSafe program was contingent upon the agreement to this MOU. Private sector partners 
were also able to engage in in-person meetings with FFC personnel as well as ILO personnel in 
their specific region. FFC personnel explained that these face-to-face contacts helped to establish 
relationships and communicate the diverse needs of both parties. At the time of study, the FFC 
utilized BusinessSafe to disseminate notices regarding breaking news, possible threats, suspicious 
activity, and specific preparedness techniques pertinent to approximately 4,000 local business 
partners.  
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An innovative and comprehensive private sector engagement program was also found with 
the SNCTC. One of the self-proclaimed “greatest strengths” of the SNCTC was its ability to collect 
suspicious activity information from the community generally and private sector more specifically. 
Given Las Vegas’ reliance on tourism, the hospitality-dominated business industry in the area, and 
the interconnectedness of high traffic tourism and the SNCTC’s counterterrorism mission, the 
SNCTC recognized the need to develop a formal relationship with the hospitality industry to serve 
as a force multiplier. With this in mind, the SNCTC created a formal partnership with the Las 
Vegas Convention and Visitor Authority (LVCVA). Similarly, the LVMPD entered into a formal 
agreement with the LVCVA to enhance this private sector initiative. This agreement outlined the 
responsibility for both organizations to provide certain services in accordance with their respective 
statutory authority. The LVCVA determined that being a formal and active participant of the 
SNCTC was a direct benefit to the hospitality industry in Clark County. As part of this agreement, 
the LVCVA is a member of the board of governors (oversight committee) of the SNCTC and is 
required to dedicate personnel, or provide the financial support to hire personnel, in order to fulfill 
the mission of SNCTC. In order for this formal partnership to work effectively, the participatory 
role of the LVCVA in the SNCTC was adapted to allow participation without violating any statutes 
or laws regarding confidentiality and privileged information to which only law enforcement 
agencies have access. To facilitate this partnership, the LVMPD hired a private-sector specific 
intelligence analyst dedicated to the interests of the hospitality industry. This analyst is funded by 
the LVCVA but is an employee of LVMPD and is assigned to the SNCTC for the purpose of 
responding to the needs and security of the hospitality industry.  
Though the private sector is primarily concerned with criminality related to gaming in 
Nevada, they are committed to an all-threats approach with the SNCTC. A highly successful 
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example of this partnership was a SAR initiative between the University of Nevada Las Vegas 
Institute for Security Studies, state and local public safety, homeland security agencies, and the 
SNCTC to develop a terrorism SAR awareness video titled “Nevada’s Seven Signs of Terrorism”. 
The video - available in both English and Spanish languages - provides an informative summary 
key behaviors and activities that are characteristic of terrorist planning and preparations. The video 
used local examples in order for viewers to personally relate to the information. The key to the 
success of the terrorism SAR video was the fact that hotels in Las Vegas required all employees 
to view the video; a promising indication of commitment to the partnership between the SNCTC 
and the private sector hospitality industry.  
The MIOC has employed a different model to facilitate direct communication with their 
diverse stakeholders; a dedicated set of sector-specific telephone source lines. These lines would 
be direct communication channels for three key sectors: 1) critical infrastructure and key resources, 
2) environmental risk, and 3) border security. At the time of study, the Critical Infrastructure and 
Key Resource Desk (CIKR) was the only operational source line. The environmental risk and 
border security lines were programs in progress, but would follow a similar model. The CIKR was 
a telephone source line, with multiple dialing numbers, created to specifically receive and 
distribute information with the private sector. This point of contact was staffed around the clock 
with personnel trained specifically with knowledge of the state’s key critical resources and partners 
(such as car manufacturers). Private partners were able to call the CIKR desk to provide 
information they believed the MIOC would deem beneficial or to receive information in response 
to an inquiry. An additional function of this desk was to conduct private sector outreach to promote 
capabilities of the MIOC. Although private sector liaisons were not formally integrated within the 
MIOC structure on a full-time basis at the time of study, this desk shared intelligence analytic 
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products with private sector members on both a proactive and need-to know basis. Personnel 
staffing the CIKR desk were responsible for reaching out to existing partners to solicit feedback 
regarding intelligence products and information needs while also making contact with new 
potential partners that may have been unaware of the MIOC.  
In sum, the FFC, SNCTC, and MIOC each exhibited unique practices for cultivating 
relationships, especially with respect to non-law enforcement partners. These practices took the 
form of active and dedicated outreach efforts that aligned with fusion center, partner, and local 
needs. These practices range in scope and scalability and it appears to be incumbent upon 
individual fusion centers to assess what local partners should be formally involved with the center 
and what form their outreach efforts should take in attempting to leverage potential relationships. 
The practices identified here can likely be modified or amended to meet a range of fusion center 
needs.  
 
4.3 Methods of Sharing Information: Survey Results 
The types of information being shared with officers and partners are characterized in three 
basic ways:  Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI), For Official Use Only (FOUO) and Law 
Enforcement Sensitive (LES). The fusion center that produced the intelligence product is stating 
the information is not for public distribution and asking that recipients only share the information 
with those persons who have the “right-to-know” and “need-to-know” the information. Despite 
these caveats, there is no sanction if the information is shared widely. While virtually all fusion 
centers have access to classified information, the distribution of these materials is closely 
monitored because there are both administrative and criminal sanctions if these guidelines are 
violated. 
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Just as relationships and initiatives to cultivate information sharing between fusion centers 
and external organizations are critical to success, so too are the methods through which information 
and intelligence are disseminated to, and collected from, external organizations are salient to 
sustained success. In two case studies of fusion center end-users, Lewandowski and Carter (2014) 
and Ratcliffe and Walden (2010) observed that recipients of fusion center products may become 
frustrated with formal, bureaucratic processes to receive information and intelligence from fusion 
centers. While these studies are insightful to understand end-user perceptions, little is known 
regarding the mechanisms through which fusion centers disseminate information and intelligence 
products and how such mechanisms are perceived by fusion center personnel. The following 
findings lend insights into this unknown.  
 Survey respondents were asked to indicate through which methods their fusion center 
disseminated information. The results are reported in Figure 2. Generally, respondents reported 
sharing information through less formal methods. Email (79%), personal contact (73%), and 
meetings (66%) were the most frequently reported methods. Though less frequent, respondents 
indicated sharing information via telephone (40%) and fax (20%) as well. Information sharing 
systems – such as RISS.net and Law Enforcement Online – were reported to be used by 61 percent 
of respondents. HSIN (operated by DHS), RISS.net (operated by the Bureau of Justice Assistance) 
and Law Enforcement Online (operated by the FBI) are all secure but unclassified information 
systems. The Fusion Center Guidelines urge fusion centers to “leverage the databases, systems, 
and networks available … to maximize information sharing (Global Justice Information Sharing 
Initiative, 2003, pp.6). These information sharing systems are designed to facilitate the sharing of, 
and access to, information between fusion centers and external partners. Given the importance of 
such systems to information sharing, survey respondents were asked to indicate if they had access 
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to an information sharing system and whether or not they perceived the system to meet their 
information sharing needs.  
As illustrated in Figure 3, there exists a large discrepancy between respondent registered 
user access to these sharing systems and respondents’ perceptions that the sharing systems met 
their information sharing needs. The Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) (91%), Law 
Enforcement Online (LEO) (89%), and Regional Information Sharing System (79%) were the most 
frequently reported systems to which respondents were registered users. Across all of the systems 
reported, HSIN was the most positively viewed system with only 20 percent of respondents 
indicating it met their information sharing needs. Interviews suggest that intelligence personnel 
and analysts, while having access to all these systems and more, will typically default to the use 
of one system – often that is a local system rather than the national system. Ironically, a commonly 
expressed frustration was that HSIN, RISS.net and LEO all required complex configurations of 
passwords that had to be changed every six months. This stumbling block became sufficiently 
prominent that representatives from the three systems, met on several occasions with the Criminal 
Intelligence Coordinating Council to develop processes to have a Single Sign On (SS) for all three 
systems. Despite a consensus in the value of the SSO, the hurdle could not be cleared. Insights 
from the case studies help to understand the gap between user access and perceived utility 
illustrated in Figure 3.  
 
 
[ Insert Figure 2. Methods of Sharing Information approximately here ] 
 
[ Insert Figure 3. Information Sharing Systems approximately here ] 
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4.4 Methods of Sharing Information: Case Studies Findings 
Contextualizing these descriptive findings are the specific information sharing practices of 
the three case study fusion centers. Each of the three case study centers had access to Law 
Enforcement Online and the Homeland Security Information Network. Despite being registered 
users of these networks, all three fusion centers have created their own secure information sharing 
portal. In each instance, the fusion center personnel explained that the creation of their own system 
allowed the fusion center to tailor the system functionality to meet their information sharing needs 
as well as the needs of their partnering external organizations. These unique, center-specific 
systems were used to communicate with local partners while national systems (such as LEO and 
HSIN) were used for communications with other fusion centers. Each center expressed varying 
levels of dissatisfaction with the national information sharing systems (i.e., HSIN, LEO, etc.). 
Personnel at each of the centers expressed similar sentiments that these systems were of “basic 
functionality” and that varying functional aspects could be enhanced to better serve their needs. 
An issue of common occurrence was that many local agencies – and especially community 
organizations and private businesses – lacked awareness and access to formal sharing systems as 
a result of bureaucratic approval processes.  
Law enforcement agencies carefully control access to information systems for three basic 
reasons:  (1) concerns about privacy, and consequently, civil liability (2) concerns that sensitive 
threat information and (3) historical information contained in police records systems simply should 
not be shared with non-law enforcement personnel. Moreover, each center expressed displeasure 
with an inability to have a more two-way system of information sharing where fusion centers could 
26 
 
push intelligence products to the community as well as receive raw information and products from 
outside organizations via the same system. As a result of this one-way nature of formal sharing 
systems, information pushed to fusion centers from local sources typically occurs via email, 
telephone, and personal contacts. Such insight confirm the survey findings reported in Figure 2 
regarding methods of information sharing as well as the low approval of information sharing 
systems illustrated in Figure 3.  
To remedy the functional shortcomings and bureaucratic processes accompanying national 
information sharing systems, the FFC and SNCTC created their own center-specific system to 
share information directly with local partners. The FFC created the Statewide Intelligence Site 
(InSite) while the SNCTC created the All-Data Virtual Information Sharing Environment 
(ADVISE). The InSite and ADVISE systems share similar functionality that, as personnel at both 
centers indicated, are “more user friendly for our clients.” Both systems allow for active two-way 
information sharing between the fusion center and external organizations via secure online web 
access in addition to hosting access to a range of archived intelligence products, information 
bulletins, and criminal history data. From an access management perspective, each fusion center 
reviews applications for, and grants access to, the sharing system. While this process requires 
certain checks and balances, such as verifying user information and compliance with privacy 
regulations, the processes for external organizations to gain access to these unique systems – and 
thus engage in information sharing – are more streamlined and efficient when compared to national 
systems.  
Moreover, personnel interviewed at both the FFC and SNCTC indicated the management 
of their own sharing systems allowed them to better identify and track the organizations in which 
they were engaged for information sharing. This allowed both centers to further develop 
27 
 
relationships and initiatives with these external partners as well as develop plans for information 
collection requirements based on both fusion center and client needs. Though the MIOC utilizes 
HSIN as their primary sharing system, it decided to integrate a system known as Memex that 
created compatibility and information compliance with the data systems of their existing law 
enforcement partners. MIOC personnel interviewed explained that this decision was driven by 
feedback from external partners who expressed frustration with the HSIN portal. As one supervisor 
at the MIOC noted, “Our users couldn’t simply pull down information we made available or push 
us information they thought was relevant…Memex made the sharing of information a more 
functional reality.” 
 
4.5 Mechanisms to Affirm Appropriate Intelligence Practices: Survey Results 
As noted in the review of literature, fusion centers have been the focal point of criticism 
regarding individual privacy with respect to the collection and retention of personal identifying 
information; especially terrorism-related information. Though a salient issue for society in general 
and fusion center research and practice more specifically, the protection of individual privacy in 
the fusion center environment has received sparse scholarly attention. To this end, Figure 4 
displays the extent to which survey respondents indicated they had mechanisms in place to 
safeguard individual privacy. The two most frequent mechanisms were a specific policy to guide 
the sharing of information with external organizations (88%) and a record system that is compliant 
with 28 CFR Part 23 (88%); the leading regulatory requirement governing the retention of personal 
identifying information in law enforcement criminal intelligence records systems. Consistency 
with federal privacy standards (78%), auditing intelligence records (78%), and requiring privacy 
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policy training (71%) were also quite common among the centers sampled. Interestingly, only 32 
percent of respondents indicated they provided privacy training to local law enforcement.   
 
[ Insert Figure 4. Safeguarding Privacy approximately here ] 
 
4.6 Mechanisms to Affirm Appropriate Intelligence Practices: Case Studies Findings 
These descriptive findings generally illustrate the steps fusion centers are taking 
nationwide to safeguard against violations of privacy; however they provide little insight regarding 
specific practices as to how fusion centers operationalize such safeguards. The three case studies 
provide detail as to how this is achieved. To begin, each of the case study centers instituted policies 
and practices that are tailored to a system of check and balances. One of the most common 
approaches to establishing operational policies to guide the legal collection and handling of 
information was the establishment of memorandums of understanding (MOU) between the center 
and formal information sharing partners. The FFC, MIOC, and SNCTC each discussed their 
MOUs and noted that each included specific language directed to the legal compliance of 
information collection, storage, and dissemination. Any entity seeking to receive information from 
the fusion centers – including other law enforcement agencies – must sign the MOU prior to 
gaining access to information and intelligence products. Each fusion center provided the research 
team a copy of their MOU for review. Though each MOU varied with respect to references to 
specific state laws and guidelines, consistent characteristics of these MOUs included direct 
language guiding the definition of privacy, consent to records audits, maintaining security of 
information, responsibility for the accurate documentation and dissemination of information, 
liability for improper dissemination, and the responsibility of the partnering organization to 
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provide privacy training for each user seeking access to fusion center information. Furthermore, 
each center examined employs a vigorous privacy policy6 that is accessible by law enforcement 
and the general public via the fusion center’s website.  
Unique practices to safeguard privacy emerged within each center. At the FFC, the Director 
receives guidance from a Constitutional Protections and Privacy Advisory Board (CPPAB) that 
collaborates with community privacy advocacy groups to ensure that privacy and civil rights are 
appropriately protected by the FFC’s information acquisition, dissemination and retention 
practices as defined by the FFC's written policy. The CPPAB is comprised of three members not 
actively associated or employed by the FFC or participating agency. The members are individuals 
with well-established credentials in the fields of criminal justice and/or the law. At the time of 
study, the CPPAB members are comprised of an American Civil Liberties Union Director from 
the state of Florida, a retired Special Agent in Charge with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
and a member from the Center for Advancement of Human Rights at Florida State University. The 
CPPAB reviews and recommends updates or changes to the FFC privacy policy and procedures 
for protecting civil rights and civil liberties in response to changes in applicable laws, or as 
otherwise necessary. The CPPAB is consulted to participate in any independent inquiry into 
complaints of alleged privacy violations and advises the FFC of their findings and any 
recommended corrective action. The MIOC leverages a similar privacy advisory board comprised 
of community privacy advocates, privacy-trained law enforcement officers, and a delegate 
appointed by the Director. Unlike the FFC CPPAB, the MIOC’s privacy board is less formal and 
typically convenes in instances where a privacy complaint has been filed. The FFC CPPAB is a 
                                                 
6 The Privacy Policy is a national standard required of each fusion center in order to receive federal funding. 
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more innovative model that should be considered a “best practice” for other fusion centers across 
the country. 
The SNCTC employs a dedicated group of personnel referred to as the “Quality Assurance 
Section” (QAS). This group of personnel is led by a deputy director of quality assurance (privacy 
officer) that oversees three sub-groups. The first is the security group that is responsible for the 
operational and physical security of the center’s classified environments, the maintenance of all 
access and alarm systems, and the proofs of compliance for all security matters. This group is also 
the single point of contact for all applications for security clearances, and maintains a roster of 
security clearances including dates for renewal investigations. Second, the privacy protection 
group that is responsible for ensuring that the SNCTC adheres to all pertinent laws, rules, and 
regulations relating to the protection of personal privacy and civil liberties. This group is also 
responsible for implementing the program and systems necessary - through training personnel - to 
provide regular and periodic audits to ensure compliance and provide proofs of compliance for all 
SNCTC investigations and intelligence products. Lastly, the performance measurement group 
tasked to develop and collect the data to measure the ability of the SNCTC to perform its 
established mission. As it relates to privacy, this group seeks to determine if all operational tasks 
engaged in by the SNCTC align with the information sharing privacy policy, federal privacy 
standards, and applicable state and federal laws. Moreover, the QAS is responsible for ensuring 
compliance of information sharing partners with all applicable policies and laws. Thus, the QAS 
has regulatory power over the SNCTC as well as external partners seeking to engage with the 
SNCTC.  
 
5. Conclusions and Implications for Policy 
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 The present study provides unique insights into the operational nuances and challenges 
faced by fusion centers nationwide as well as a number of insightful mechanisms through which 
centers can navigate these challenges. At the heart of effective threat prevention, mitigation and 
response is two-way information sharing among all agencies that have a responsibility for the 
safety, security and sustained functionality of America’s communities. To this end, if processes 
are not developed to ensure full participation of all information sharing partners, the functional 
capability of the fusion centers will be reduced. Sampled fusion center personnel indicated efforts 
to develop relationships with different agencies; especially other law enforcement agencies and a 
more diverse range of public safety, private sector, and public health organizations. To achieve 
their goals, these partnerships need to be broadened and substantively sustained. While it is 
achievable, it is a difficult barrier to overcome.  
Comprehensive threat assessments require raw information from diverse sources to 
maximize validity and reliability of analysis. As such, fusion centers must proactively reach out to 
both law enforcement and non-law enforcement partners to 1) communicate center resources and 
capabilities, 2) learn about local intelligence needs, 3) develop local collection requirements to 
make information sharing more efficient/effective, and 4) develop mechanisms that allow for more 
efficient two-way information sharing. For fusion centers to be effective, reciprocal information 
sharing relationships must be developed with law enforcement agencies within the jurisdiction of 
the fusion center. Findings indicate that the most effective way to accomplish this is through an 
ILO/FLO program that can build and sustain local law enforcement relationships.  
Many aspects of a fusion center's work is different than the typical law enforcement 
experience. There are different processes, responsibilities and nomenclature. Findings indicate that 
the role of the fusion center is not intuitively apparent to law enforcement officers nor is the 
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importance of a trusted, two-way information sharing relationship. A remedy learned from the site 
visits is the benefit derived from the fusion centers providing training to local law enforcement 
personnel, intelligence analysts and in some cases relevant private sector employees. Beyond the 
substantive knowledge that is shared in training programs, important personal contacts are made 
and the fusion center can be marketed to local law enforcement. This outreach component builds 
relationships and helps ensure the quality and legal integrity of information provided to the fusion 
center.  
While experience remains limited, findings indicate that there is value to clearly defined 
public-private partnerships. There remains challenges for information sharing between fusion 
centers and private entities due to privacy issues. Similarly, some private sector entities are 
reluctant to share information with fusion centers because of uncertainty related to intellectual 
property, client privacy, and the brand image. However, where there is clear value to the 
partnership and a mechanism can be established to address concerns -- such as with the SNCTC -
- the value to both partners can be substantial.  
 The status of law enforcement intelligence in law enforcement agencies appears to be 
similar to the early development of community- and problem-solving policing during the early 
1990s and the developing literature exploring the adoption of intelligence-led policing (Carter, 
2016; Darroch & Mazerolle, 2013). Law enforcement officers and executives recognize the 
importance of intelligence yet the implementation of law enforcement intelligence remains uneven 
a decade after September 11, 2001 (9/11). Several factors may contribute to this. First, the 
philosophical underpinnings of law enforcement intelligence was significantly changed and 
broadened, hence a resocialization process among intelligence personnel had to occur. Second, 
while the 9/11 attacks remain as the benchmark for change, in reality new standards – such as the 
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National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan and training programs did not emerge until 2003. 
Moreover, new standards and directions continue to evolve even at the time of this writing. For 
example, there is an increasing application of the intelligence process for violent crime 
suppression, such as found in Real time Crime Centers -- a notable different application than the 
counterterrorism role. Third, it simply takes time to develop new organizations such as fusion 
centers and develop them at an operational level. Similarly, training and developing new policies 
in America’s approximately 16,000 law enforcement agencies is a massive task, particularly when 
new processes – such a participating in a fusion center – must be marketed and sold to the agencies 
as wise investment in resources.  
 Although the results of this study point to clear progress in the development of law 
enforcement intelligence capacity, they also reveal challenges. Clearly, there is a need for the 
commitment of resources in the form of personnel and training. Given the federated and 
decentralized structure of law enforcement in the U.S., it is critical that mid- to large agencies have 
analysts who can conduct local level analysis as well as push information and intelligence to fusion 
centers. Findings from the present study suggest small agencies should have intelligence liaison 
officers who can serve as “nodes” in the intelligence network. This requires commitment of 
resources at a time when many agencies are operating under conditions of financial constraint. 
Law enforcement executives as well as policymakers at local, state, and federal levels will need to 
consider the implications of these budgetary issues. While many executives acknowledged that the 
use of analysts made the agency “work smarter” thereby having a notable effect on crime and 
community order, it remains a difficult concept to sell to the public and politicians. It is also clear 
that there is a need for continued and expanded training. This includes specific training for 
analysts, fusion center personnel, and intelligence managers to include specifying types of 
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information can be shared, the process for sharing information, and the application of guidelines 
to protect privacy, civil rights and civil liberties. 
Collectively, the data identified a number of factors that help safeguard against privacy and 
civil rights concerns while concomitantly maximizing both threat detection and risk reduction. The 
policy implications will reinforce the protection of civil rights in the intelligence process while 
maximizing the organizational effectiveness of the fusion center. As a result of concerns by some 
community members about privacy and civil rights protections related to the intelligence process, 
fusion centers should ensure their privacy infrastructure is in place. This includes having a privacy 
policy, training personnel on privacy guidelines, and having a privacy review board such as the 
one discovered in the FFC. This review board should include diverse members from outside the 
fusion center to elevate legitimacy and best ensure accountability to ultimately ease privacy 
concerns of fusion center practices.  
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
 
Table 1. Fusion Center Respondent Descriptives (n = 96) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  n (Percent) 
Respondent’s Position 
          Administrator 
          Supervisor 
          Investigator 
          Analyst 
Not Specified 
 
49 (51%) 
19 (20%) 
7 (8%) 
10 (10%) 
11 (11%) 
Respondent Years at Fusion Center 
          Less than 1 Year 
          1-3 Years 
          4-9 Years 
          More than 10 Years 
          Not Specified 
 
10 (10%) 
39 (41%) 
26 (27%) 
5 (5%) 
16 (17%) 
Operational Focus of Fusion Center  
Terrorism Only 5 (5%) 
“All-Crimes” 28 (29%) 
“All-Crimes, All-threats, All-Hazards” 50 (52%) 
Not Specified 13 (14%) 
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Figure 1. Relationships for Information Sharing 
 
 
 FBI State LE Local LE Other FC Private Sector Public Health 
Very Close Mean 0.39 0.60 0.58 0.47 0.15 0.31 
Very Close S.D. 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.35 0.47 
Distant Mean 0.13 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.22 0.18 
Distant S.D. 0.33 0.20 0.22 0.31 0.42 0.38 
Very Satisfied Mean 0.17 0.31 0.35 0.29 0.09 0.13 
Very Satisfied S.D. 0.37 0.47 0.48 0.46 0.29 0.33 
Very Close: n = 96, α = .933 
Distant: n = 96, α = .763 
Very Satisfied: n = 96, α = .914 
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Figure 2. Methods of Sharing Information 
 
 
 Email Personal Contact Formal Meetings Information Sharing System Telephone Fax 
Mean 0.79 0.73 0.66 0.61 0.40 0.20 
S.D. 0.41 0.45 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.40 
n = 96, α = .723 
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Figure 3. Information Sharing Systems  
 
 
 HSIN LEO RISS FBINET ATIX 
User Mean 0.91 0.89 0.79 0.44 0.39 
User S. D. 0.18 0.21 0.36 0.50 0.50 
DMN Mean 0.20 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.04 
DMN S.D. 0.40 0.35 0.34 0.32 0.20 
Registered User (User): n = 96, α = .564 
Definitely Meets Needs (DMN): n = 96, α = .748 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Safeguarding Privacy  
 
 
 
Intell Policy 28 CFR  Part 23 Audit 
Federal 
Standards 
Personnel 
Privacy 
Training 
Privacy 
Training to 
Police 
Mean 0.88 0.88 0.78 0.78 0.71 0.32 
S.D. 0.33 0.33 0.42 0.42 0.46 0.47 
n = 96, α = .785 
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Appendix 
Glossary for Acronyms 
 
Acronym Full Name Description 
28 CFR Part 23 
 
28 Code of Federal 
Regulation Part 23 
An operating policy for law enforcement 
agencies. It contains implementing standards 
for operating federally grant-funded 
multijurisdictional criminal intelligence 
systems. It specifically provides guidance in 
five primary areas: submission and entry of 
criminal intelligence information, security, 
inquiry, dissemination, and review-and-purge 
process. 
9/11  
 
Terrorist Attacks of 
September 11, 2001 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in 
New York, Washington, DC and 
Pennsylvania, United States. 
ADVISE 
 
All-Data Virtual 
Information Sharing 
Environment 
Secure information sharing system developed 
and utilized by the Southern Nevada Counter-
Terrorism Center to share information across 
sectors and partners.  
CIKR Critical Infrastructure 
and Key Resource 
Desk 
An outreach program in the Michigan 
Intelligence Operations Center to facilitate 
information sharing partnerships across non-
law enforcement organizations.  
CPPAB 
 
Constitutional 
Protections and Privacy 
Advisory Board 
Advisory board within the Florida Fusion 
Center that collaborates with community 
privacy advocacy groups to ensure that 
privacy and civil rights are appropriately 
protected by the center’s information 
acquisition, dissemination and retention 
practices as defined by written policy. 
CUI 
 
Controlled Unclassified 
Information 
Information that requires safeguarding or 
dissemination controls pursuant to and 
consistent with applicable law, regulations, 
and government-wide policies but is not 
classified under Executive Order 13526 or the 
Atomic Energy Act. 
DHS 
 
U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security 
Cabinet organization in the United States 
government that oversees domestic security. 
FDLE  Florida Department of 
Law Enforcement 
State law enforcement entity of Florida. 
FFC 
 
Florida Fusion Center State fusion center in Florida. 
FLO 
 
Fusion Center Liaison 
Program 
Initiative to designate a single point of contact 
between a partner organization and a fusion 
center to facilitate information sharing.  
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FOUO 
 
For Official Use Only A document control designation, but not a 
classification. This designation is used by 
Department of Defense and a number of other 
federal agencies to identify information or 
material that, although unclassified, may not 
be appropriate for public release. 
HSIN  
 
Homeland Security 
Information Network 
Information sharing network for homeland 
security mission operations to share sensitive 
but unclassified information. 
InSite  
 
Statewide Intelligence 
Site 
Secure information sharing system developed 
and utilized by the Florida Fusion Center to 
share information across sectors and partners. 
ILO  
 
Intelligence Liaison 
Officer Program 
National program in the United States to train 
individuals in public safety and the private 
sector to facilitate the flow of information 
from local to federal law enforcement 
operations. 
ILP 
 
Intelligence-Led 
Policing 
An underlying philosophy of how intelligence 
fits into the operations of a law enforcement 
organization.  
 
LEO  
 
FBI Law Enforcement 
Online 
Secure information sharing system for law 
enforcement that is provided by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation.  
LES  
 
Law Enforcement 
Sensitive 
A document control designation, but not a 
classification. This marking indicates 
recipients should be law enforcement 
personnel.  
LVCVA  
 
Las Vegas Convention 
and Visitor Authority 
The official marketing organization of Las 
Vegas that promotes tourism, conventions, 
meetings and special events. It is a formal 
partner of the Southern Nevada Counter-
Terrorism Center.  
LVMPD Las Vegas 
Metropolitan Police 
Department 
Municipal police department of Las Vegas, 
Nevada and operating agency of the Southern 
Nevada Counter-Terrorism Center.  
MIOC  Michigan Intelligence 
Operations Center 
State fusion center in Michigan. 
MOU  Memorandum of 
Understanding 
Written policy agreement that guides action, 
inaction, expectations, and procedures for 
partnerships.  
MSP  Michigan State Police State law enforcement authority of Michigan.   
QAS 
 
Quality Assurance 
Section 
Dedicated personnel within the Southern 
Nevada Counter-Terrorism Center that 
oversee legal, ethical, and policy compliances 
for information sharing.  
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RISS.net 
 
Regional Information 
Sharing System 
Network 
Secure information sharing system to 
facilitate capabilities, critical analytical and 
investigative support services, and event de-
confliction across the United States.  
SAR Suspicious Activity 
Report 
A report containing observed or reported 
behaviors that may be indicatives of terrorist 
planning or criminal activity.  
SNCTC 
 
Southern Nevada 
Counter-Terrorism 
Center 
State fusion center of Nevada.  
SSO  Single Sign On Initiative to develop credentialing that allows 
for session/user authentication process that 
permits a user to enter one name and 
password in order to access multiple 
applications or secure systems.  
 
 
 
 
